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different payout mechanisms on willingness to pay. In this study 74 student subjects are involved in a setting where the manager is determining
his own compensation. A series of experiments that vary managers' ability to determine their own compensation and investors' ability to punish
inappropriate behavior are reported. The experiments involve pairs of subjects consisting of an investor and a manager with asymmetric decision
making powers. When managers compensate themselves inappropriately, investors' recourse is to shun the company's sharesda model that
arguably corresponds more closely to reality than the accepted efficient market traditional paradigm. The experiment shows that managers share
profits even when investors cannot withhold investment and investors fairly compensate managers as well. This pattern explains both the ability
of capital markets to function despite the presence of inherent moral hazard, and occasional managerial misbehavior.
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On February 11th 2009 it was revealed that the 700 top
executives at Merrill Lynch (today part of Bank of America)
received bonuses of US$3.6 billion and another 149 em-
ployees received US$858 million according to the New York
Times, while the company experienced US$27.6 billion in* Tel.: þ90 212 5336532 1603.
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Eckel and Professor Rachel Croson for their notable comments in this study.
This experiment was performed while the author was visiting University of
Texas, Dallas. The author would like to thank Dean Professor Hasan Pirkul
and Professor Robert Kieschnick and the Department of Finance and School of
Management for their hospitality. The author also thanks the Sam Houston
State University Business Conference participants, and the University of Texas
at Dallas Finance Seminar participants for their comments.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).losses for the full year. This is one example of corporate ex-
ecutives destroying the value generated by a firm. Other
notable examples include General Electric, Citibank, AIG and
Morgan Stanley. In the same year many hedge fund scandals
became public, where various managers (most infamously
Bernie Madoff) extracted assets from the fund as a result of
weak governance. In response to each of these news items,
worried investors drove share prices lower. Such incidents
receive abundant media attention but are for the most part rare
relative to the number of firms. Another angle is that investors
are changing to become more hands-on than before and some
reduction of CEO pay through the shareholder monitoring
mechanism can be affected (Ertimur, Muslu, and Ferri (2009)).
Nevertheless, current practice brings into question whether the
traditional manager-investor model in finance is missing a
critical moral hazard problem on the part of managers.
Sappington (1991) focuses on surplus division between prin-
cipal and agent (investor and manager in this experiment) andting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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absence of the same beliefs, efficient levels of performance
and surplus division may not be achieved and this may cause
problems. Additionally, principals and agents may not have
aligned goals where agents act as self-interested individuals
maximizing their own income and may perform little to avoid
bad outcomes for the company. Crotty (1990) notes investors
and managers have different objectives and information sets
according to Keynes' analysis. The aim of this study is to
contribute to fill the gap and analyze the moral hazard problem
by analysis of investor and manager profit sharing in a
simplified environment, where the focus is on how investor
willingness to pay (WTP) and manager compensation are
related and what happens with changes in company income
distribution for investors and managers.
In this study a paradigm where there are two classes of
stakeholders - a manager class and an investor class-is studied.
Capital and management are the two inputs for the firm's
production function and each is indispensable. That is, without
either capital or management, no production can take place
and a unit of production is foregone. The manager's role in this
setting is not specifically modeled. That is, the manager's
simplified role in this setting is merely to be present at the time
of production. For that function the manager receives
compensation to be determined either by management or in-
vestors. The manager's compensation may be determined by
the investor or by the manager himself (as suggested by the
examples discussed above) and managerial misbehavior was
rare). Several variations on this setting are run, varying the
way manager's compensation is determined. The results show
that the investors indeed adjust asset prices in response to
managers' actions. Surprisingly, despite potential for abuse,
managerial expropriation of profits is limited. Different func-
tional forms are attempted to allow for the investor's utility.
The findings suggest that certain axioms of rationality are
violated (e.g., De Bondt, 1998). Statman (2014) notes people
are more normal (occasionally irrational) than rational, mar-
kets are not efficient and behavioral differences in decisions
affect investments and outcomes. It is difficult to change
mental frames when individuals use past prices as an anchor
and their perceptions of value are overly optimistic. The
findings support the previous work of Haruvy, Lahav, and
Noussair (2007) that beliefs are adaptive and based on past
trends.
In the third setting of the experiment, there is a manager
who decides the dividend and possibly his own compensation.
The investor must then decide how much the share is worth
and this will depend largely on his trust in the manager. Thus,
three crucial elements in the setting are identified: (1) the ef-
fect of dividends on asset price, (2) the moral hazard inherent
in some forms of managerial compensation, and (3) trust be-
tween investors and managers. Prior to this study various other
studies only address the first two issues mostly separately.
This study contributes an analysis combining all three of
the above aspects.
The effect of dividends on asset price. Dividends may have
an important role to play in a company's valuation. Managershave private information on the company's future cash flow
generation and increase or decrease the dividend payout ac-
cording to private information available to them. Thus, divi-
dends may have an informational content where a change in
the dividend policy may be interpreted by the investors as a
change in management's view about future prospects of the
firm. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) find that
executives believe that dividend and repurchase decisions
convey information to investors. In general the belief is that
decreasing dividends can be particularly harmful. Consistent
with that view, Allen and Michaely (1995) find that the market
reacts positively to dividend increases and negatively to div-
idend decreases. However, the opposite pattern may very well
be the case. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find that
firms that cut dividends have positive unexpected earnings in
the first year. The dividend increasing firms do not show an
obvious positive pattern of unexpected earnings in years one
and two. Lastly, Black and Scholes (1974) show that the effect
dividend policy will have on the asset price cannot be
foretold.
Managerial compensation. Cremers and Palia (2010)
analyze US data of 2200 firms and 3200 CEO's between
1992 and 2007 and find that there is a positive relation be-
tween CEO pay and tenure. The findings are consistent with
career concerns and dynamic learning hypotheses. Fosberg
(1997) reports that significant dividend increases affect CEO
compensation significantly over a two year period. Gerhart,
Rynes, and Fulmer (2009) review the literature and suggest
that a strong link between pay and performance can be an
excellent motivation for managers, however sometimes this
motivation may lead to unanticipated outcomes. Furthermore,
Dalton, Daily, Certo, and Roengpitya (2003) study ownership
in companies and performance using different measures such
as Tobin's Q, return on assets, return on equity, earnings per
share (EPS) and price-to-earnings ratio, and do not find sup-
port for agency theory's link to manager and performance, with
the exception of EPS as a variable related to officer and di-
rector equity. John and John (1993) argue that managerial
compensation is designed to give the managers incentives to
choose actions to increase shareholder wealth. An agency
problem arises when investors and management have different
interests. The experiment attempts to address the problem
where managers seek their own interests instead of the in-
vestors' interests. To align the interests of both parties
compensation should be carefully structured by the investors
(e.g. Ryan & Wiggins, 2001). However, until recently small
shareholders had limited or no power for determining mana-
gerial compensation. Until a few years ago, attempts by
shareholders to curb executive bonuses have typically been
rebuffed by the boards. Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia
(2000) note that the executives are highly informed about a
company and investors cannot closely supervise the executives
and company operations. Thus, the managers can use re-
sources for their own benefit and may not maximize the in-
terests of shareholders. Furthermore, they state that firm size is
important, however firm profitability is not as prioritized as
executive compensation.
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by Ariely (2010, chap. 1) who conducted an experiment,
where the subjects were motivated by extreme rewards similar
to CEO compensation in the US finance sector prior to 2007.
In this experiment the highest compensated subjects showed
the lowest performance.
Trust. Trust is a key element in the investoremanager
relationship. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) define trust
as the subjective probability individuals attribute to the pos-
sibility of being cheated. They find that trust has a large and
positive effect on investment in stocks. The findings show that
better informed and more educated people rely less on trust
and social people hold more stocks and exhibit more trust.
Camerer (2003) finds that early on in a strategic interaction
there is strategic trust regarding future benefits but this trust
diminishes as future benefit shrinks towards the end of inter-
action. Camerer, Johnson, Sen, and Rymon (2002) also
demonstrate that people do not look ahead nor use backwards
induction reasoning. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995)
measure investors' appropriate reward behavior in an experi-
ment and show that fairness and trust have effects on reci-
procity and kindness towards one's counterparty. Lunawat
(2013, 2012) find that investment is higher in a voluntary in-
formation disclosure regime where managers disclose infor-
mation about dividends and that this improves both parties'
welfare when the role of trust in the separation of ownership
and control is analyzed.1.1. Research questionsThis study is different from previous research in the sense
that it is not trying to measure the appropriate level of man-
agers' compensation, however, the aim is to observe whether
self-centered behavior occurs when the investor and manager
are left free to make their decisions. In the traditional
manager-investor paradigm in the economics and business
literature, the manager is the employee of the investor-owner.
In agency theoretical terms, the manager is the agent and the
investor is the principal. The main issue in that literature is to
properly align manager incentives with those of the investor-
owner (executive compensation) and investor control (board
selection, auditing).
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) study the interaction of control
and motivation in an experimental principal-agent game and
find that control brought about results where managers
perceive control as a signal of distrust and a limitation of
their autonomous position. They report variance in perfor-
mance at low and high wages, where control leads to lower
performance at high wages. One example of the disadvan-
tages of lack of control is the mad rush by some executives to
award large bonuses at failing financial institutions facing
clear ruin. Investors' only recourse is often to dump shares.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) investigate the link be-
tween agency issues and CEO pay and report that better
governed firms pay their CEO's a less amount for luck since
firms with large shareholders and smaller boards are better at
excluding this luck component when determining pay. Whilethis view of the world allows for neat mechanism design
implementations, it appears a bit out of touch with the
investoremanager relationship observed in the financial
sector in the US before 2008. Reality suggests that at least in
some cases top executives largely determined their own
compensation. These incentive schemes are often not in the
investors' best interest. The aspect that is not analyzed in
depth in the traditional paradigm is the idea that investors
have some say on compensation, perhaps through represen-
tation on the board or through voting rights. Ertimur et al.
(2009) studied 1198 shareholder proposals between 1997
and 2007 and found that there is some reduction of CEO pay
through the shareholder monitoring mechanism, indeed this
monitoring mechanism helped led to the resignation of the
CEO of Citibank in 2012.
The traditional investor-is-the-owner view would call for
reform of boards as well as manager's compensation. So the
goal here is to study the manger-investor game as can be seen,
characterize its theoretical equilibrium in the absence of
exogenous shocks, and then examine behavioral implications.
In particular, we seek insights into what an unscrupulous
manager might do in a system like this, and how behavior
interacts with compensation considerations.
1.1.1. Model
The model has two inputs of production: management and
capital. The firm needs both inputs, in some pre-determined
quantities, to acquire each unit of production capacity. For a
unit of production capacity to be acquired in a period, the
manager has to provide one unit of management, which is
linked to a bonus compensation mechanism. The investor must
provide capital. In addition to the manager and investor, there
is non-strategic broker who mediates the share selling trans-
action. Of the price paid per share, a certain proportion goes to
buy the productive capacity, and the rest is divided between
broker and manager (90:10 in this example).
Each unit of productive capacity results in output (profit)
from a known distribution. The manager in the main setting
under investigation has sole decision making power in how
the profit is to be divided between investor and manager. He
divides the profit for a period by issuing a dividend for the
period. The dividend may be greater or smaller than the
profit for that period. The game is repeated for n rounds. First
a finite version (10-periods) of this game is studied to
analyze principal-agent surplus distribution under different
settings. At the end of round ten the company dissolves and
has no value.
The easiest setting to characterize is one where the manager
declares the dividend after the investor makes the purchase
decision in each period. In period 10, the manager should
declare no dividend regardless of investor action. Then the
investor in period 10, correctly anticipating such action,
should not be willing to purchase any sharesdi.e., be willing
to pay zero dollars per share. Anticipating this, the manager in
period 9 has no incentive to offer a dividend, and so on. The
game unravels to where no shares are purchased and no pro-
duction ever takes place.
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Two alternative behavioral models come to mind. One is a
consideration for fairness by the manager. The manager may
care about equal division of surplus. In that case, the following
predictions arise:
H1. Dividend payment depends on the profit realization in a
period.
H2. Price paid by the investor depends on the dividend
payment.2
Miller and Rock (1985) state dividends convey information
by signaling future earnings However, dividends can be
misleading about the true value of the firm as managers have
incentives to manipulate share prices. Kumar (1988) states
there are signaling models but the empirical evidence shows
that dividends are not leading indicators of future earnings but
more a lagging indicator of past earnings.3 Increases in divi-
dends cause increases in prices with a low signal as indication
for future earnings. Dividends will not vary one-to-one with
the prospects of the firm but will signal only a broad quality of
the firm as there exists a conflict of interest between manager
and shareholders.
The second model is a strategic one. Fehr and G€achter
(2000) note in people's behavior reciprocity is an outcome
frequently observed contrary to expectations of self-interest.
Some people act fair-mindedly in general, however they may
act self-interestedly in competitive markets. Likewise, self-
interested people may act fair in strategic environments. The
manager may wish to signal that he might be fair-minded. In
that case, the manager should behave as a fair person would
behave, until shortly before the terminal date, where such
behavior no longer pays off. At that time, as one approaches
termination, the manager should defect. If they are economi-
cally rational actors a clear cut break from positive dividend to
zero dividends at some point towards the end should be
observed.
H3a. There should be a decline in dividends over time.
Consequently, rational investors should respond accord-
ingly and decrease their WTP as the session progresses.
H3b. Investors decrease their willingness to pay over time.
1.1.3. Tests for fairness considerations
The benchmark condition is the setting described above.
Under the hypothesis that the manager is fairness minded
(non-strategic), this should make a difference in allocation
proportion (conditional on period profit and price, etc.) and
whether the dividend is announced before or after the investor
decides on price. Strategically, however, the backward in-
duction argument fails if the manager announces dividends2 This hypothesis is supported by Demirtas and Zirek's (2011) findings that
aggregate returns are linked to earnings in emerging markets and the earnings
of the company are used to predict future returns.
3 Kirkulak and Kurt (2010) reconfirm that earnings are a major source help
to determine the dividends.before the investor makes a choice. So this is a fair test for
strategic behavior on the part of the manager. Hypothesis 4 is
stated in two parts. Part (a) pertains to the investor's rational
anticipation of the manager's behavior during the experiment
where the manager decides the dividend before the investor
bids for price and part (b) pertains to the investor's decision for
the dividend and the manager's strategic behavior with an exit
option.
H4a. The willingness to pay by the investor in a setting where
the manager declares dividends before trading will differ from
the willingness to pay by the investor in a setting where the
manager declares dividends after trading or the investor de-
clares the dividend.
H4b. The willingness to pay by the investor in a setting where
the investor declares dividends will differ from the propor-
tional allocation of surplus in a setting where the manager
declares dividends.
Finally, we need to know what constitutes the utility
maximizing allocation in the investor's mind. That is, if the
investor or the manager was truly the owner of the company,
how would they like to divide the surplus between themselves?
Note that this is not a “fair” allocation per se. It is the allo-
cation that in theory maximizes one party's utility given his
own other-regarding preferences. It is a decent benchmark for
what the investor or the manager would like to get both in
absolute dollar terms as well in percentage of surplus terms. It
is also an unbiased estimate of total surplus. This brings us to
the next hypothesis. This paper is related to Fehr, Kremhelmer,
and Schmidt's (2008) analysis from a trust perspective, where
they report experiments on allocation of ownership rights with
respect to fairness. They cannot explain the outcome with self-
interest theory. Contrary to expectations, they find that joint-
ownership is the most efficient form of ownership although
they start from different initial conditions.
H5. The proportional allocation of profit of the investor will
depend on the profit of the manager.2. Method2.1. Experimental designThe study involved 74 student subjects from a major public
university in the southern United States. No subject partici-
pated in multiple sessions. This study was run in 10 sessions.
Each session used one of three treatments explained in Table 1
below and lasted about 30 min including instruction time.
Each session also paired students together as manager andTable 1
Experiment design.
Treatment # Subjects # Rounds
“Dividend before.” Dividend announced before trading 24 10
“Dividend after.” Dividend announced after trading 30 10
“Investor control.” Dividend decided by the Investor 20 10
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500 experimental tokens (200 token ¼ $1) and no shares.
Shares purchased throughout the experiment carried no value
at the end of the experiment. The manager and the investor
were each compensated according to their final profit at the
end of the experiment. Shares purchased by the investor in
each round continued to earn the applicable dividend of each
successive round as decided by the manager. The z-Tree
program (Fischbacher, 2007) was used as the user interface for
the computerized experiments. Subjects earned anywhere from
$2 to $6 each for about 10e15 min of participation.
Table 1 reports a summary of three treatments with 10
periods each. In Treatment “Dividend Before”, the subject in
the role of manager determined and announced the dividend
before the investor had the opportunity to buy in each period.
In Treatment “Dividend After”, the subject in the role of
manager determined and announced the dividend after the
trade decision was completed by the investor in the period. In
Treatment “Investor Control”, the investor decided on the
dividend before making the trade decision. All other aspects
were kept identical across treatments.
There is a firm the investor can invest in and in each round
the firm yields a profit per share outstanding. The profit-per-
share is a random number between 2 and 12 tokens, where
each round has a different profit per share. The profit per share
for each round is known only to the manager and not
communicated to the investor. However, on average, this profit
is 7 tokens per round (70 tokens over 10 rounds).
In each round, the investor announces a price which he is
willing to pay for one share. This number is randomly selected
by the computer between 0 and 90 for 10 rounds. The in-
vestor's stated price and a random number generated by the
computer determine whether the investor buys a share. The
share price and ownership is decided according to the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak method. If the investor's price exceeds the
computer generated random price, he buys a share at the
second highest price (the computer's price). If the investor
buys a share, he gets the dividend announced for the round
plus all future dividends announced in future rounds for this
share. If a share is purchased, the manager earns a 10%
commission on the market price and all shares held in a round
get the same dividend in that round. This is to ensure that the
managers are compensated parallel to real life examples to
align the executives' and investors' incentives, where the in-
crease of the share price benefits both parties and if the
company goes bankrupt then both parties are worse off.Table 2
Experiment results.
Treatment Payout
ratio %
T-test for
Payout ratio
Last period
Payout ratio %
T-te
per
T1. Dividend before 110 76
T2. Dividend after 88 0.01** 56 0.2
T3. Investor control 74 0.00** 82 0.8
All studies 91 69
Notes: The three columns show p-values for t-tests. T-test for payout ratio, t-test for
the first row, as T1 and T3 in the second row. Standard errors in parentheses. * siThis experiment links the manager and investor directly and
questions if they can mutually exist in an efficient environ-
ment. The different designs are structured to see if decisions
are influenced by different treatments. The aim is to determine
if the manager and investor are selfish in surplus division and
how strategically the manager and investor interact. This
experiment introduces a simplified environment of real life
capital markets, where only one asset is introduced with a
finite life and it is similar to other experimental studies for
ultimatum game studies from a fairness point of view. The
contribution of this study is that it considers the capital market
example where the surplus distribution and fairness of in-
vestors and managers under different settings is questioned
with a closer link to real life with trading.
3. Results
Contrary to what one would expect, results indicate that the
managers and investors do not conform to the purely selfish
model of behavior in surplus division. On the one hand, in-
vestors are paying high prices when it is not economically
rational by backwards induction to do so. On the other hand,
managers do not expropriate the entire profit, even later in the
life of the asset. Over treatments, an average of 90% of firm
profit is distributed to investors although the managers
decrease the dividends towards the end of the experiment to
70% averaged over treatments. Camerer (2003) notes that
strategic trust diminishes towards the end of the interaction
and the present finding is in line with that theory. With few
exceptions the observation shows that investors and managers
behave fairly to the other party even when it is not rational to
do so. Interestingly, the results show that the managers are
more generous as decision maker for dividend distribution
compared to investors. The majority of the investors are
paying high prices to purchase the share especially in the
second part of the experiment proving that they do not use
backward-induction strategy.
Table 2 reports that the dividend is lowest when the
investor decides on distribution (74%) whereas when the
manager announces the dividend prior to trading, the dividend
is highest (110%). All findings of all participants in our
experiment, however far they deviate from the mean are
analyzed, since in real life sometimescompanies such as
General Motors continue to distribute dividends for signaling
purposes, when they were unprofitable. Overprice is defined
as the investor's paying an x % higher price than the rationalst for last
iod payout ratio
WTP T-test for
WTP
Cumulative
shares
Investor's
overprice %
35 3.8 47
1 43 0.07* 4.8 84
0 50 0.00** 6.8 75
42 5.0 70
last period payout ratio and t-test for WTP are for T1 and T2 are reported as in
gnificance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level.
Fig. 1. Payout ratio and difference with rational price.
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times 11, minus current round number (e.g. this number will
be (2 þ 12)/2  10 ¼ 70 in the first round). Investors purchase
more shares when dividend policy is investor-determined,
on average 3.8, 4.8, 6.8 for studies 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
This is a sign that the investors trust their own decisions at a
higher rate.
Fig. 1 shows the investor or manager's dividend distribution
and it can be seen that towards the end of the experiment the
dividend level declines as expected. There are very few
managers observed trying to distribute dividends which are
greater than profits generated. .Most of the managers and in-
vestors behave strategically but the investor's also protect the
manager's rights. The investors don't distribute all profits.
Fig. 1 shows that investors continue to purchase shares to-
wards the end of the experiment and the managers continue to
distribute dividends. Irrational pricing behavior is observed
especially in the second part of the experiment and investors
overprice for 68% of the transactions.
Table 3 shows the surplus division between the manager
and the investor. Table 3 shows the investor has 39% of the
total surplus. The investor has negative profit in the first three
rounds but realizes increased profit through the experiment
and has highest profits in the second half due to dividend
collection. The manager has the lowest profit in round 4 and
the highest profit in the last round of the experiment.
Note that the managers maximize profit in round 8. There is
no significant difference between dividends quoted in periods;Table 3
Surplus division statistics.
Treatment Investor surplus
division %
Manager surplus
division %
Total s
genera
Dividend beforea 86.6 13.4 655
Dividend after 20.3 79.7 1145
Investor control 37.6 62.4 1149
Overall average 39.3 60.7 983
a One manager bankrupted in this experiment (dividend before) effecting the resu
numbers. If the bankrupted manager is included in the numbers, the numbers chan
1240. In that case the Investor gets 100% of the surplus.however, managers decrease the payout ratio towards the end
of the experiment. Dividend and company profit are positively
related. There is no finding which proved investors' rational
pricing mechanisms in the second half of the experiment. They
follow discounted prices in the first half.
The investors calculated an average price but not the time
value of the price. The investors quoted higher prices than the
rational prices 60% of the time (Only 163 out of a total of 410
observations quoted at less than implied price). The moral
hazard problem was not present in this experiment where the
managers did not have strong control and power. One manager
quoted very high dividends and was bankrupted. Only three
managers quoted 0 as dividend and two in the last session. Few
managers acted strategically and quoted higher dividends in
the earlier periods. Only one investor quoted 0 as price and not
in the last round.
Table 4 shows simple regressions run to examine the sig-
nificance of predictions of Hypotheses 1e5. Subject hetero-
geneity was controlled for via fixed effects. Otherwise random
effects are used.
Result 1. Hypothesis 1 is supported in that the dividend
depends on the company's profit in the period. That is, the
manager does allocate some of the profit to investors. As
discussed earlier, this is likely due to fairness motives since the
investor cannot observe company profit and the manager is
able to expropriate the profit or to make a strategic decision
without regard to profit.
Result 2. Hypothesis 2 is supported. Prices paid by the
investor depend on dividend payment. Thus, the investor acts
as a reciprocator. Surprisingly neither the managers nor the
investors act strategically towards the last period and the in-
vestors continue to quote high prices towards the last round of
the experiment. The managers don't act strategically where
rationally they would be expected to decrease the dividends to
0 in the last round, especially when the dividends are
announced after investors bid for shares. As expected the
Results 1 and 2 are in line with Brav et al.'s (2005) findings.
Result 3. Hypothesis 3a is not supported. While there is
evidence that the dividend declines over time as indicated by
the sign of the time coefficient as well as supporting evidence
in Fig. 4 and Table 2, this effect does not appear significant in
the regression. In Hypothesis 3b, however, investor willing-
ness to pay still exhibits a strong time effect and is affected
negatively with time. Since strong treatment effects are not
observed in the regression, the result of the model does not
provide support for Hypotheses 4a and 4b. The willingness tourplus
ted
Average investor total
profit at the end of session
Average manager total
profit at the end of session
603 508
515 561
536 579
533 550
lts of 12 pairs, therefore one bankrupted manager's pair is excluded out of the
ge as: Total Surplus: 828, Total Manager's Profit: 412, Total Investor's Profit:
Table 4
Regression analysis and model.
Dividend Dividend/Profit per share Manager's profit per round Investor's Willingness to Pay (WTP)
Intercept 1.04 (0.52) 0.80** (2.3) 0.82 (0.19) 44.79** (8.05)
Company profit per share 0.45** (H1) (4.18)
Dividendt1 0.15** (2.53)
Dividend 0.72** (H2) (3.46)
Time 0.14 (1.31) 0.03 (H3a) (1.62) 3.05**(H3b) (2.9)
Cumulative number of shares 3.91** (H5) (9.67) 3.89** (2.35)
Investor's profit per round 0.38** (H5) (13.44)
Treatment effect
(dividend before)
8.36 (H4a) (1.21)
Treatment effect (investor control) 0.88 (H4b) (0.13)
R2 0.441 0.479 0.643 0.059
Heterogeneity specification Fixed effects Random effects Random effects Random effects
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level.
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dividends before trading will not differ from the willingness to
pay by the investor in a setting where the manager declares
dividends after trading or where the investor decides on the
dividends. The experiment does not lead to changes in in-
vestor's WTP in different settings. This may be partially due to
the effect that the investors highly overprice the shares until
the end of the experiment (especially in the second part of the
experiment). If there is a difference in WTP in different set-
tings, this may not be measurable since the overpricing of the
shares could be dominating the price.
In line with Camerer (2003) the results show that managers
do not act self-centered and similar to ultimatum game studies
they distribute a reasonably high portion of the profit of the
company as dividends to the investors. They continue to
distribute dividends even when it is not economically rational
for them to do so. The results also show that backward-
induction is not used and investors are not acting fully ratio-
nally in their share purchases and do not take the time factor
into consideration. Although they decrease the willingness-to-
pay with time the amount of decrease is not in line with a
rationally expected decrease of willingness-to-pay for shares.
Result 4. The relationship between the profit of the manager
and the investor is tested and significant results are found sup-
porting Hypothesis 5. Investor's willingness to pay is affected
positively by the dividend and the cumulative number of shares,
and is affected negatively with passing time. Investors increase
their prices as dividends increase and adjust their pricing strat-
egy as a session progresses toward its end. WTP is expected to
gradually diminish to 0 for the rational investor as the session
progresses towards its end. That this effect was not observed in
our experiment is an important finding of this study.
The number of shares in circulation has a positive effect on
investors' willingness to pay and the reason for this effect is
not very clear. This brings to mind that they may be willing to
purchase more shares since they own some already and this
may mean that they attach a high value to them (endowment
effect). However, if the session's end is approaching, then it is
not rational to quote higher prices. Nonetheless, it was
observed that the investors do not act on this information even
though they are already informed that the shares will beworthless by the end of the experiment. Instead, they act with
bounded rationality. In spite of the information they have, they
do not act upon this information and continue to bid for shares
at a price higher than the rational price (R2 ¼ 0.059%). The
result indicates that the profitability of the manager increases
where the profitability of the investor decreases and vice versa.
The manager's profitability increases with investor control,
since they purchase more shares because they trust more,
hence the investor's profitability on the average is not maxi-
mized with this behavior.
4. Discussion
Akyıldırım and Soner (2014) suggest that standard finance
models assume the markets to be efficient and the investors
are rational, hence many studies find human irrationality in
investments causing investment losses. The purpose of this
work was to investigate the implications of moving from the
traditional compensation paradigm where the investor is the
owner and the manager serves at the investor's pleasure to a
possibly more realistic paradigm where the investors and the
management team have a seemingly more adversarial rela-
tionship involving the division of the surplus. This relation-
ship has clear and serious implications regarding profit
expropriation by the manager in the later stages of the asset's
life and consequently investors' withholding capital. What is
observed is more of a trust game pattern, where investors trust
the managers with their capital and managers, with some
exceptions, not exhibiting opportunism to the extent expected
from rational selfish managers. The rational principal agent
model, which predicts that by the end of the experiment the
price and the dividend should decline to zero, is not fulfilled.
Instead, there is only a small decrease in prices and dividends
over time. It is encouraging to see that investment occurs
despite the strong rational investment prediction of no trade.
This is because managers are not selfish-rational so there is no
unraveling to zero investment. The results show that the
managers are more generous as decision maker for dividend
distribution compared to investors.
The results of this study can be linked to the experimental
study of Andreoni (1995) who finds that kindness and
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his findings it is against rational expectation to find that people
who understand free-riding, give anyway. This result can be
used for improving regulatory policy to limit free-riding and
self-interested behavior mechanisms by managers in line with
Fehr and G€achter's (2000) findings of reciprocity. Particularly,
crowding out of fairness through regulation (by government)
or monitoring (by the board or by auditors) is the natural
extension that comes to mind.
In future research these improvements could be studied. A
structural break was not tested specifically for, but strong
declining dividends and WTP towards the end of the game
suggest strong strategic concerns. As we observed non self-
interested behavior in our limited set-up, it may be useful to
suggest analyze of the behavior of the investor and manager in
an experiment having multiple assets, different managerial
control options and a real market environment with a share
purchase option to further analyze the effect of the real market
on behavioral aspects.Appendix.
Experiment instructions
Welcome and thank you for your participation. Your role is
___Investor ___Manager.
This session will take 15 min. The roles are randomly
assigned. You are paired with another anonymous participant.
One of you will act as an investor; the other will act as a man-
ager. Your earnings will depend on your actions and the actions
of the other participant. The experiment involves 10 rounds, and
there are two stages per round. There will be two trial rounds.
Stages of each round.
Stage 1:
Both manager and the investor begin with 500 tokens.
The profit-per-share is a random number between 2 and 12
tokens. The average profit per share in each round is 7 tokens
(7  10 periods ¼ 70 tokens over all periods).
The manager and the investor both see the profit-per-share.
[In Treatment Dividend Before add: The manager decides
on the dividend.]
[In Treatment Investor Control add: The investor decides on
the dividend.]
Stage 2:
 The investor enters a price he or she is willing to pay for
the share.
 The market price of the share is determined as follows:
There is a reservation price calculated by the computer,
which is the minimum acceptable market price (a random
number from 0 to 90). The investors' stated bid price for
the share can be lower than this random number. In that
case no transaction will take place. The investor will not
pay anything and will not receive any shares. If the investor's price is higher than the reservation price,
he purchases one share at the reservation price and pays
the amount to the manager to be deposited to company
accounts. If a share is purchased, manager earns 10%
commission on the market price.
 [In Treatment Dividend After add: The manager decides
on the dividend.]
 The manager pays the dividend for all shares held by the
investor. The investor receives the dividend for all shares
held by the investor.
Method for Calculation of Reservation Price: The minimum
share purchase price in each period will be decided according to
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak method. There will be random
number of profit generated by the computer for each round and
this number will be multiplied by 10. The reservation price will
decline with the number of the remaining periods.
Value of a share to investor:
The investors receive a dividend for each share they hold at
the end of each period. The dividend may be less than, equal
to, or greater than the profit generated per share. There is a
limit for maximum dividend paid to investors.
The value of each share to the investor is the entire expected
dividend stream for that share. For example, if there are 6 periods
left, a share is worth the sum of dividends in these 6 periods.
 At the end of 10 rounds [In Investor Control Treatment: or
if the manager decides to terminate the session earlier], all
shares will be worthless (will be worth zero tokens).
Manager earnings: In each round the manager earns the
profit per share minus the dividend on each share held, plus a
10% commission on the market price if a share is purchased in
the period.
Investor's earnings: In each round, the investors earn the
dividend times the number of shares they hold, minus the
amount paid for shares purchased.
Earnings are cumulative for the ten rounds and include the
500 tokens participants begin with. Tokens are converted to
dollars at a rate of 200 tokens ¼ $1.
Fig. 2. Differences of Investor and Rational Price.
l Review 15-2 (2015) 106e114Fig. 3. WTP Difference of Investor and Manager.
Fig. 4. Payout Ratio.
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